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that there is still ample passage way for
the public: State v. Knopp, 6 Conn.
415; Hubbard v. Deming, 21 Id. 356;
1 tate v. Merrit, 35 Id. 314, explaining,
Burnham v. Hotchkiss, 14 Id. 311;
Com. v. WMlkinson, 16 Pick. 175; Com.
v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234; Stoughton
v. Porter, 13 Allen 191 ; Com. v..King,
13 Met. 115; Hyde v. Middlesex, 2
Gray 267; Holbrook v. McBride, 4 Id.
220; Morton v. Moore, 15 Id. 576 ;
Com. v. Wilkinson, 16 Pick. 175 ; Har-
rower v. Ritson, 37 Barb. 301; People
v. Cunningham, I Denio 524 ; contra,
Grifith v. McCullum, 46 Barb. 561;
Peckham v. Henderson, 27 Id. 207 ; the
obstruction of a railway across a highway
without proper authority is an obstruc-
tion for which the company is liable to
indictment: Com. v. Nashua 4- LSowell
Railroad, 2 Gray 54; Same v. Vermont
etc., Railroad, 4 Id. 22; Same v. Old
Colony etc., Railroad, 14 Id. 93; and
the confirmation by statute of the ille-
CENT DECISIONS.
gal location is no defence: Com. v. Erie,
etc., Railroad, 27 Penn. St. 339 ; it is
no defence that if the obstruction is re-
moved the public would not then use the
highway, because a bridge has been
swept away, and not rebuilt: Com. v.
Deerfield, 6 Allen 449; digging post-
holes in a street is a public nuisance,
although it be done in a part of the
street not used, nor susceptible of use
by the public, by reason of natural ob-
structions therein : Wright v. Saunders,
65 Barb. 214 ; but where the defendant
built a wharf into a harbor, it did not
necessarily follow, because the wharf
was beyond the line of low-water that it
was a common nuisance ; the presumption
is, that it is a detriment to the public,
but the presumption may be repelled by
showing, that so far from having created
a detriment to the public, he has increased
the accommodation of the public: Com.
v. Wright, Thach. Crim. Cas. 211.
W. N. S.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.,
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.$
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.
4
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
5
AMENDMENT. See Replevin.
Attachment sur Judgment- C"ericaZ Error.-The recital in an attach-
ment on judgment issued out of the same court in which the judgment
was recovered and remained of record, that the judgment had been
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 12 or 13 Otto.
2 From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 71 Maine Reports.
2 From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 52 Maryland Repors.
4 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter ; to appear in 33 N. J. Eq. Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 51 Wisconsin Reports.
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recovered at a court begun and held on the second Monday of March
instead of the second Monday of February, is a mere clerical erroi
which it is the duty of the court to correct by ordering the writ to be
amended: First National Bank of .Hagerstown v. Wreckler, 52 Md.
ATTORNEY.
Duty of Court to Disbar on Cause shown.-When it is shown to the
court that an attorney-at-law has violated his official oath, in that he has not
conducted himself in his office with all good fidelity to his clients, the
court is not only warranted but required to remove such a one from the
office of attorney and counsellor of the court ; Strout v. Proctor, 71 Me
BANKRUPTCY.
Discharge- Cannot be contested in State Court.-The validity of a dis-
charge under the United States Bankrupt Act, cannot be contested in
the state court for the intentional and fraudulent omission of the plain-
tiff's names in the list of creditors and the fraudulent omission to give
them notice of proceedings in bankruptcy: Baily v. Corruthers, 71 Ale.
The validity of a discharge can only be impeached in the District
Court of the United States, in which it is granted: Id.
Procuration-Actve Assistance of Debtor-Knowledge by Creditor of
intent to commit Fraud on the Act-Knowledge of Attorney.-Where
the debtor was a son of the plaintiff- and actively contributed to having
judgment rendered before it could have been done without such aid,
this was procuring his goods to be taken on execution within the mean-
ing of the 35th section of the bankrupt law, as modified by the Act of
1874: Rodgers v. Palmer, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
In order that the assignee shall recover the value of the goods seized
on execution it is not alone sufficient that the bankrupt should have
aided in procuring the seizure, but it is also necessary that the creditor
should have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insol-
vent and should have known that a fraud on the bankrupt act was
intended. But in such case the knowledge of the creditor's attorney is
the knowledge of the creditor: Id.
Hoover v. West, 91 U. S. 308, distinguished: Id.
BILL OF EXCEPTIO14S.
Decision on Plea of Nul tiel record- What must be set forth in the Bill.
-If a party intend to have the decision of the court below on a plea of
nul tiel record, reviewed in the Court of Appeals, he must tender a bill
of-exceptions, setting forth the record offered in evidence under the plea,
the ruling of the court with respect to it, and the exception thereto:
First National Bank of Hagerstown v. Weckler, 52 Md.
When it should contain all the Evidence.-Where the error assigned is,
that the court erroneously charged the jury that the evidence tended to
show certain facts the bill of exceptions must contain the whole evidence
Potter v. Third NatiJnal Bank of Chicago, S. G. U. S., Oct. Term
1880.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Note payable to Maker's Order- Collateral Obligation by Third Party
-G-uaranty-Endorsement.-A note made payable to the maker's own
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order and endorsed by him, thereby becomes payable to the bearer:
Bishop v. Rowe, 71 Me.
When a third person, a stranger to such a note, gives the holder his
written obligation, in consideration of the discounting of the note, " to
be holden precisely the same as if I had endorsed said note," he does not
thereby become a party to the note; and, upon non-payment according to
its terms by those liable upon the note, if he pay it, in pursuance of such
written obligation, he is entitled to the note undischarged, and to main-
tain an action on the same in his own name. Id.
Right of bona fide Purchaser-Setting aside Verdict against.-The
rule is firmly established that the holder of a negotiable paper, taking it
in the usual course of business, for a sufficient consideration, before its
maturity, and ignorant of any facts impeaching its validity, can recover
against the maker; and when the verdict of the jury is not in accord-
ance with this rule, a new trial will be granted: Burrill v. Parsons,
71 Me.
CONTRACT.
Conditional Acceptance of Order-Privity of Contract.-The eighth
count of the narr. in this suit, brought by the appellee against the
appellants, declared upon the following order and acceptance:
"Granite, Aug. 28th 1877.
Messrs. GILL & McMAHON,
Gent.: Please pay Win. F. Weller, or order, $200 on Sept. 10th, and
your note for bal. due on forty thousand Belgian paving blocks, at $48
per thousand, James Clegg agreeing to deliver you, forty or more thous-
and blocks, on the line of your road on cars, or the place called the
Summit. JAMES CLEGG."
"We accept this order when the blocks is delivered.
GILL & M 'cAHON."
It was in evidence that thirty-eight thousand three hundred blocks
were delivered by Clegg and received by the defendants, before the 10th
of September. On the 11th, the plaintiff took possession, under a bill
of sale, of the granite blocks quarried by Clegg; and on the next day
called on the defendants, to ascertain the number of blocks that had
been delivered, and proposed to deliver the balance, when he was in-
formed by them that they did not then want them, that they bad no use
for them. The plaintiff directed his men to deliver at the "Summit"
the remaining seventeen hundred blocks, which was done four or five
days thereafter. The defendants refused to receive them ; but the
blocks were nevertheless " dumped" out upon the ground, there being
no cars there at the time in which to put them. Held:
1st. That the acceptance of the order was conditional, and binding on
the defendants only in the event that the whole number of forty thous-
and blocks should be delivered by the 10th day of September.
2d. That as there was no privity of contract between the defendants
and the plaintiff, and as the whole right and claim of the latter was
based upon the order and acceptance, no right of action could arise, the
condition not having been performed by the delivery of the blocks
before the 10th day of September: Gill v. Weller, 52 Md.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See United States Courts.
CORPORATION.
Liability for Negligence-Duty arising from Nature of Franchse-
Question of Negligence for Jury.-An organization under a charter,
which provides, that certain persons named, with their associates and
successors "are hereby made and constituted a body politic and corpo-
rate" and as such "may sue and be sued, prosecute and defend to final
judgment and execution," "1 and may hold real and personal estate not
exceeding $50,000 at any one time, and may grant and vote money,"
and " haye all the powers and privileges, and be subject to all the liabili-
ties incident to corporations of a similar nature," constitutes a corporation
which would be liable to any person suffering damages through a negligent
performance of any of its duties: Weymouth v. P1enobscot Log Driving
Co., 71 Me.
Where the charter for a log driving company provides, that the "com-
pany may drive all logs and other timber" in a certain stream, the word
"may" is to be construed as permissive and not imperative. But when
the company accepts the privilege thus conferred of driving "all the
logs," &c., it assumes a duty commensurate with the privilege conferred.
By this acceptance it has the exclusive right to drive all the logs, and
the duty to drive results; Id.
Whether the agents of a corporation have been negligent in perform-
ing their duties is a question for the jury : Id.
COSTS. See Will.
EM1INENT DOMAIN.
Corporation-Exercise of Rights granted by Charter-Not liable for
Consequential Damages.-When the legislature, in the legitimate exer-
cise of the right of eminent domain, has chartered a corporation with
certain powers and privileges, the corporation, in the exercise of its cor-
porate rights, is not liable for consequential damages arising from such
exercise, without fault or negligence on its part: Sumner v. Richardson
Lake Dam Co., 71 Me.
ENCUMBRANCE. See Insurance.
EQUITY.
Relief from Consequences of Complainant's Negligence- When not
Granted.-Equity will not relieve a plaintiff against his own acts or
contracts, on the ground of mistake or ignorance of facts, where such
mistake or ignorance was caused by his gross negligence: Conner v.
Welch, 51 Wis.
Plaintiff, holding a mortgage of land, purchased the land of the mort-
gagor, assuming, in consideration thereof, the payment of three earlier
mortgages, and agreeing to release the debt secured by the note and
mortgage, running to himself. One S. held the three earlier mortgages,
and had also docketed a judgment against the mortgagor, which was
subsequent to all such mortgages, and had assigned it to W. Plaintiff
paid the amount of said three mortgages to S., and at his request, S.
satisfied them of record; but plaintiff did not then know nor did S.
inform him of the existence of said judgment. There was no fraud er
VOL. XXIX.-45
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collusion on the part of W. Upon these facts and others recited in the
opinion as to plaintiff's intelligence, knowledge of business, opportuni-
ties for ascertaining the existence of the judgment-lien, and acquaint-
ance with facts which should have put him upon inquiry: Held, that
equity will refuse, on the ground of his negligence, to re-establish in
his favor, as against such judgment, the lien of the four mortgages or
any of them: Id.
Bill to remove (,loud on Title- When not Sustained.-A bill in equity
will not be sustained to cancel or remove an alleged cloud upon the title
when the invalidity of the agreement, deed or other instrument consti-
tuting such alleged cloud is apparent on its face. Nor when the invalid-
ity of a tax title is involved without tender or offer to pay the tax, interest
and charges, if such tender or offer is required by the stat. 1874, c. 234,
when the deed is void on its face: Briggs v. Johnson, 71 Me. "
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Bill of Exceptions.
Accounts Stated by Auditor-Reviewable, though not Excepted to.-
Where accounts are stated by the auditor to represent the views and
claims of the respective parties under their instructions, such accounts
may be reviewed on appeal, though no exception thereto was taken in
the court below by either party: Walter v. Foutz, 52 Md.
Decree authorizing Comptroller-General to take charge of Railroad
-'When not a Final Decree.-After the appointment of a receiver of
a railroad, the comptroller-general of the state petitioned to be allowed
to take possession of the road, and if it should be deemed advisable to
continue the receivership, that he should be permitted to perform that
duty. The supreme court of the state, upon appeal, adjudged that he
was entitled to possession, the assets to be subject to the direction of the
court, and the judgment not to affect the liens or rights of creditors,
and remanded the case to the court below to give effect to the judgment.
Held, that as the rights of the comptroller-general against the parties
to the suit had not been finally settled, a writ of error to the judgment
of the supreme court was premature and must be dismissed: Band v.
.agood, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
Objection as to Time of Production of Evidence.-An objection as to
the time of the production of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal:
Crenshaw v. Slge, 52 Md.
Practice-Submission of Cause-When not allowed.-Where several
causes, involving the same question, have been litigated by counsel em-
ployed by all the defendants out of a common fund, and have been
brought up on writ of error, the appellate court will not accept the sub-
mission of one of them by new counsel against the wishes of the parties
to the other suits, collaterally interested in the decision: St. Louis
Smelting and Refining Co. v. Kemp, S. C. U. S., -Oct. Term 1880.
Vexatious Appeal-Right to give Damages for Delay.-Under sect.
1012 Revised Statutes, providing that appeals shall be subject to the
same rules as writs of error, the Supreme Court haspower to adjudge
damages for delay, on appeals as well as on writs of error; and rheir
power is not confined to money-judgments only : Gibbs v. Diekma, S
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
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ESTOPPEL.
Owner of Land- When not Estopped by Silence-Record Notice.-To
estop the owner of land from asserting his title, on the ground that he
has induced the person claiming such estoppel to believe that the title
was in another person, an intention to deceive and mislead, or negli-
gence so gross as to amount to constructive fraud, must be clearly shown:
Kingman v. Graham, 51 Wis.
Where the title to land has been duly recorded, the owner may gen-
erAlly presume that a person negotiating is acquainted with the record,
and he cannot ordinarily be estopped by mere silence, though if he is
directly apprised that such other person is about to act in ignorance of




Replevin against Officer- Wihen not Maintainable.-Where an officer
has not possessed- himself of chattels under a writ in such a manner
that he could maintain trespass or replevin against a wrongful taker,
replevin will not lie against him by the real owner, who is a stranger to
the writ: Libby v. Murray, 51 Wis.
Not abated by Death-Duty of Officer- When not a Trespasser.-
At common law a writ of execution in the hands of an officer for service
is not abated by the death of the judgment-creditor, and it is the duty
of the officer to serve it: Wing v. Hussey, 71 Me.
It is the duty of an officer to serve an execution in his hands for that
purpose, notwithstanding the death of the judgment-creditor while the
execution is in the officer's hands, and in arresting and committing the
judgment debtor he is not a trespasser: Id.
When no trespass is committed by an officer in serving an execution,
it follows that the person directing the service is not guilty of tres-
pass: Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
Liability of Administrator for Interest.-An order of distribution of
an estate was made in December 1867. One distributee was absent,
and, on the presumption of his death, his next of kin applied for his
share, but the administrator refused to pay it over, and no compulsory
proceedings were taken against him. The administrator retained the
share ready for payment until April 1877, when he deposited it in a
savings bank, where it drew six per cent. interest. Shortly afterwards,
he withdrew it and applied it all to. his own use. The distributee
appeared in 1878, and in proceedings against the administrator's sure-
ties, Held, that they must pay interest on the share at six per cent.,
after and during its deposit, and at seven per cent. (the legal rate) from
the time of its withdrawal until July 4th 1878, and at six per cent. (the
legal rate from that time) subsequently: Matter of Doremus's Estate,
33 N. J. Eq.
Investments- When illegal- Commissions-Partial Accounts.-An
executor has no right, without authority from a competent court, to
invest the funds of an estate in municipal bonds or bank ?tock: Tucker
v. Tucker, 33 N. J. Eq.
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W1.ere commissions are paid on part of the estate at an intermediate
accounting, commissions can only be allowed on the amount which comes
into the executor's hands afterwards, and such commissions are calcu-
lated as if the subsequent receipts were part of the prior receipts; Id.
GARNISHMENT. +
Voluntary Conveyance-Balance in Hands of Trustee-Indefinite
Answers.-When property has been conveyed by the principal defend-
ant to the alleged trustee, and not purchased by the trustee, any balance
of the same, in the hands of the trustee, over and above the amount
the defendant owed him would be held by him without consideration,
and would be attachable by prior creditors: Barker v. Osborne, 71 Me.
Where by the disclosure of an alleged trustee, it appears, that at one
time prior to the service of the writ upon him, he held funds of the
principal defendant, which would be attachable in that suit, the burden
is upon the trustee to show, that, prior to the service, he had expended
such funds for the defendant's benefit, and this cannot be done by
doubtful, indefinite and sweeping statements, with an omission of details
and particulars: d.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Liability of Guardian for Property Received- Guardian's own
.Note.-A guardian was held liable for the amount of a promissory note
given by him to his ward's mother, and after her death taken into his
own custody ostensibly for safe keeping, such note being found after his
death among his effects, with his signature torn off, and also for the
proceeds of sale of certain furniture, which also belonged to the ward's
mother, and was sold at auction by him; and it was held to be no de-
fence that no administration of the mother's estate was ever taken out;
both the note and the furniture having been taken by the guardian, as
such, into his possession: McGill v. O'Connell, 33 N. J. Eq.
INFANT. See Guardian and Ward.
INSURANCE.
Agreement in Application-Promissory Warranty-Distinction be-
tween Technical and Substantial Breach.-It was stated upon the form
of application for insurance, and provided in the policy, that such appli-
cation was a part of the contract, and a warranty on the part of the
insured; and by such application he agreed to use only lard and sperm
oil for lubricating in the mill insured, and also stated that there was a
forcing pump on the premises designed expressly for extinguishing fires,
and agreed to have it at all times in condition for use, with a proper
supply of good hose on hand. -Held, that these were promissory war-
ranties, in the nature of conditions subsequent: CoPp v. German Amer-
ican Ins. Co., 51 Wis.
While a trifling departure from the letter of such a condition, a merely
technical breach, or (probably) an accidental or involuntary failure to
perform the condition, not sanctioned by or known to the insured, and
which did not increase the risk, would not be held to defeat the policy,
yet any substantial breach would defeat it: Id.
Encumbrance-Mechanic's Lien-'ilisrepresetations-Pleading.-In
%n action on a policy of insurance on a mill and machinery, the answer
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was, that, by their application for insurance, plaintiffs represented and
warranted that at the time the policy was issued there was but $5000
encumbrance on the property, whereas in fact there were encumbrances
hereon largely in excess of that sum: but the nature of such addi-
tional encumbrance was not averred. Plaintiffs went to trial without
demurrer or motion to make the answer more definite and certain.
Held, 1. That a subsisting lien of a mechanic or material man, for
which a petition has been filed, is an encumbrance, within the ordinary
meaning of the word.
2. That, under the pleadings, it was error to reject the evidence
offered by defendant of such an encumbrance existing at the time of the
application, and not mentioned therein: Redmon v. Phenix Fire Ins.
Go., 51 Wis.
INTEREST. See Executors and Administrators.
JUDGMIENT.
Entry of at Term subsequent to Verdict-Recital of in Attachment
- Variance.-The record of a judgment on which an attachment was
issued, showed that the verdict was rendered at November Term 1875,
and that a motion for a new trial was immediately made before the
judgment was entered on the verdict. This motion was not disposed
of until the following February Term, when it was overruled and judg-
ment on the verdict was then rendered. The writ of attachment
recited that the judgment was recovered at February Term. Held, that
no judgment could properly have been rendered until the motion for a
new trial had been disposed of, and there was consequently no variance
between the writ of attachment and the judgment: First Nat. Bank of
Haqerstown v. Wreckler, 52 Md.
JUROR.
O1jection after Verdict- When not Allowable.-Au objection to a
juror, which if seasonably made would have been valid, will not avail
after verdict without proof affirmatively that the objection was unknown
to the party making it, or his attorney, at or before the trial: State v.
Bowden, 71 Me.
When an objection to a juryman is known to the party or his counsel
when the jury is being impanelled, it must be taken then or it will be
deemed waived: Id.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment-Action for Breach of, when Main-
tainable.-When the declaration does not allege an eviction of the
plaintiff by the defendant's grantee, nor the taking of anything from
the premises leased, an action on the covenant for quiet enjoyment
cannot be maintained: Ware v. Lithgow, 71 Me.
NEw TRIAL. See Bills and Notes.
PARTNERSHIP.
Contract between Partners- When Enforceable at Law.-A contract
between partners, which can be enforced without a general accounting
as to the partnership business, may be enforced at 'aw, if of such a
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nature as to be .,) entorceable when made between persons not partners.
Edwards v. Remington. 51 Wis.
1f the several members of a firm. indebted in at least a certain sum,
by mutual agreement apportion that sum among themselves, each pro-
mising the others, in consideration of their like promises, to pay 
a stipu
lated amount and save them harmless therefrom, the contract 
is enforce-
able at law: Id.
Change of Firm-.Y
e w Firm not Liable for Old Debts-Right of
Partner to bind Firm for Individual Debt.-On the 
dissolution of a
firm and the formation of a new one, consisting in part of the 
same niem-
bers, the new firm cannot be bound, without the consent 
of all its mem-
bers, for the debts of the old ; fcLindlen v. IWentworth, 
51 Wis.
One partner cannot bind the firm for money borrowed 
by him to pay
for his share of the capital stock, especially where the lender 
knows for
what purpose the money is obtained : Id.
A firm is not liable for a debt contracted by one partner on 
his indi-
vidual responsibility, although the consideration goes into the 
firm busi-
ness, if, as between the partners, the debt ought to be paid 
by the one
who contracted it: Id.
PLEADING.
Plea Answering Part of Declaration only- Trespass- 
Count charg-
ing Two Jointly-Defect in one of two Cunts-Demurrer.-If 
a plea
undertake to answer the whole declaration, but in fact 
answers a part
only. the plea is bad, and the plaintiff may demur: Willing v. Bozrnan,
52 Md.
A count charging one of two persons with trespass, without 
designat-
ing which of the defendants committed the trespass, 
is, as a count
charging a separate trespass, bad: Id.
Where a general demurrer to pleas is sustained, the 
defendants are
not entitled to judgment because one of the counts of 
the declaration is
defective, the other counts being good and sufficient 
to support the
action: Id.
PRACTICE. See Errors and Appeals.
REPLEVIN. See Execution.
Trover for Property Replevied-Electin of Remedies-Sale 
of Pro
perty Replevied.-The pendency of a suit upon 
a replevin bond will not
bar an action of trover against one who received 
from the plaintiff in
replevin the property replevied. The rule, that 
where a party has two
remedies for the same injury the election of one 
will bar the other, does
not apply to this case: Wyman v. Bowman, 71 Ie.
A plaintiff in replevin cannot convey a good title 
to the property
replevied, if he is not the actual owner: Id.
Amendment of Complaint-Increase of Alleged Value 
of Property.-
Defendants in replevin having entitled themselves 
to a return of the
oroperty pending the action, and having disposed 
of it, there was no
error in permitting plaintiff to amend the complaint 
by increasing the
alleged value of the property: .McKesson v. Sherman, 
51 Wis.
SH.uRiT. See Execution.
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SUNDAY.
Contract upon- When not a Work of Necessity or Charity-Invalid-
ity of.--Whcre the signing of an order, drawn by P. upon J. P. in
favor of M., the acceptance, the delivery and the payment by M. to P
of the amount represented by the order, were all done on the Lord's day
iu order that, in that way, J. P. might pay a sum due for labor to P.
who was about to leave. Held, that this was not a work of" necessity
or charity," and that M. cannot recover of J. P. the amount so paid by
him upon such accepted order because the whole transaction, upon




Appeal from State Courts- When Appellate Court can look beyond
Federal Question.-In an appeal from a state court to the United States
Supreme Court the latter can only look beyond the federal question
involved, when that has been decided erroneously, and then only to see
whether there are any other matters or issues adjudged by the state
court sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment notwithstanding the
error in the federal question: McLaughlin v. Fowler, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1880.
USURY.
Mortgage-Sums paid for Renewal of Loan.-In August 1871 an
arrangement was made by which the appellants were to obtain a loan
for two years from the appellee, of the sum of $3700, the same to be
secured by mortgage. The mortgage was accordingly executed and
delivered, the sum of $222 being retained by the mortgagee from the
amount, to secure the payment of which the mortgage was given as a
bonus for the loan. In August 1873 the time for the payment of the
loan was extended, and the further sum of $262 was demanded by the
mortgagee and paid by the mortgagors, as a condition of the continuance
of the loan. In August 1875 a like extension was made, and the fur-
ther sum of $131, on a like condition, was demanded by the mortgagee
and paid by the mortgagors. Upon the expiration of the time for the
repayment of the loan, default was made, and the mortgaged premises
were sold: Held, that the retention of the first-named sum and the
demand and payment of the two other sums were usurious transactions,
and in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged
premises, the mortgagors are entitled to have said sums credited upon
the mortgage debt, as of the times when they were respectively paid:
Walter v. Foutz, 52 Md.
VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.
Bribery- United States Officer-Money not recoverable from the United
,ztates.-Where claimants of merchandise seized by military authorities
during the rebellion obtained its release not by producing evidence of
their rights but by voluntarily paying to a subordinate officer a sum of
money, the case is oqe of bribery rather than extortion, and the money
cannot be recovered from the United States; Clark v. Unzited States,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
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WARRANTY.
What Constitutes-SIfficiency of Instruction to Jury.-In an action
to recover on a promissory note, given for a certain fertilizer, the court
instructed the jury as follows : 1st. " If the jury find from the evidence
in this case, that the note upon which this suit is brought, was given
for the fertilizer called ' Eureka,' and that the said 'Eureka' was
bought by the defendant upon the representation of the plaintiff, or
his agent, that the said I Eureka' was a valuable fertilizer ; and shall
also find that the said ' Eureka' so sold to the defendant, if they find it
was so sold, was valueless and worthless as a fertilizer, then the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover." 2d. " If the jury, however, find that the
said ' Eureka' so sold to the defendant, was a valuable fertilizer, and
possessed merit as such, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover." On
appeal by the plaintiff, Held, that the court sufficiently instructed the
jury as to what they must find to constitute a warranty: Crenshaw v.
Slye, 52 Md.
WILL.
Denials of Costs and Counsel Fees to Caveators.-Although the al-
lowance of the costs, expenses and counsel fees of the caveators against
the probate of a will is, by statute, discretionary with the court, yet,
when there exist no reasonable grounds for contesting such probate, or
the litigation is needlessly protracted and expensive, such allowance
should be denied : lallett v. Bamber, 33 N. J. Eq.
Testamentary Capacity- What Evidence does not Impeach.-A tes-
tator was eighty-two years old in 1873, when he made his will. Held,
that if it be conceded that he was miserly, squalid, dishonest, profhne
and irascible ; that he cancelled a codicil to his will merely because he
believed the beneficiary named therein, who was not a relation, was
insincere towards him; that, in 1860, he revoked a trust deed in the
nature of a testamentary disposition of his property (it appearing that
he believed that he had, by its provisions, retained power to do so);
that, in 1867, he revoked an absolute gift of certain stocks; and that he
gave the bulk of his estate to his executors in trust to reduce the debt
incurred by the United States in subduing the rebellion-he having no
legitimate kindred who might, by the creation and execution of such
trust, be disinherited or disappointed in their natural expectations-those
things did not establish testamentary incapacity: In re Will of Joseph
L. Lewis, deceased, 33 N. J. Eq.
WITNESS.
Credibility- Charge of Crime.-A witness cannot be impeached by
mere proof that he was once charged with a crime in judicial pro-
ceeding: McKesson v. Sherman, 51 Wis.
